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I. INTRODUCTION
What is property? This seemingly simple question has no answer
universally accepted by courts and commentators. Most attempted
definitions, however, describe property with its accompanying rights,
which are guaranteed and protected by the government.1 The fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution, in relevant part, pro-
vides that no person may be deprived of property without due process
of law, and that the state may not take private property without just
1. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). Construing the
term "property" as it is used in the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court stated:
It is conceivable that [the term "property"] was used [in the "just compensation"
clause] in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to
which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may
have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use
and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the
latter.
Id.; accord First Charter Land Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 643 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1981)
("In contemporary jurisprudence, 'property' refers to both the actual physical object and the
various incorporeal ownership rights in the res, such as the rights to possess, to enjoy the
income from, to alienate, or to recover ownership from one who has improperly obtained title
to the res.").
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compensation.2 There may be instances, however, in which one's
interest in specific property is so small as to raise a question whether
any accompanying property rights exist at all. In these cases, the
issue arises whether the fifth amendment proscribes the taking of such
property without just compensation. The United States Supreme
Court addressed this issue in the context of fractionated 3 Indian lands
in Hodel v. Irving.'
The fractionation of Indian land resulted from federal land poli-
cies that controlled reservation territory dating back to the late
1800s.5 Under the General Allotment Act,6 individual tribe members
received tracts of tribal land, called allotments, with a restriction
against alienation.7 When an owner died without a will, as most Indi-
ans did,8 the land was divided among the heirs according to state
intestate succession rules.9 Courts allowed partition of the land only
if all the heirs agreed.'" Often heirs could not be located, some heirs
were not informed that they owned a land interest, or some landown-
ers would not agree to sell due to fear that the allotment would be
sold to a non-Indian.I' As a result of these problems, ownership of the
allotments became progressively fragmented with each succeeding
generation. 
12
In 1983, Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act 3
to consolidate these overly fractionated Indian land allotments."4 Sec-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
3. Indian land allotments, held in trust for individual Indians by the United States
government, often could not be alienated or partitioned. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707
(1987). Over time, the parcels of land became splintered into undivided fractionated interests,
with some parcels having hundreds of joint owners. Id. at 707-09, 712-13; see infra notes 5-11
& 21-34 and accompanying text.
4. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
5. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4419-20.
6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-332 (1982).
7. Id.
8. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4420.
9. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 230 (1986).
10. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4420.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, §§ 201-211, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986)).
14. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415-25.
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tion 207 of the Act provided for small allotment interests to escheat 5
to the tribe upon the death of the owner.' 6 After the Act became
effective, representatives of heirs or devisees of tribe members who
died owning escheatable interests sued, claiming that Section 207
resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment.' 7 The Supreme Court held that Section 207
resulted in a fifth amendment taking. 18
This Case Comment examines the effect of Irving on inheri-
tance,' 9 escheat,20 and freedom of testation.2' Section II reviews the
Court's reasoning in Irving through a historical perspective. Section
III examines whether the Irving Court's holding must be limited in its
application to Indian land, or whether it may have a broader scope.
Section IV then analyzes the effect of the Irving decision on escheat.
In addition, Section V explains the decision's effect on inheritance,
including freedom of testation. Finally, Section VI concludes that the
majority's opinion in Irving is anomalous to the accepted notion of
inheritance as purely a creature of statute with no constitutional basis.
Thus, the Irving case lends credence to the historically weak argu-
ment that inheritance is constitutionally protected.
II. ESCHEAT OF INDIAN LAND IN HODEL v IRVING
A. Historical Perspective
The fractionation of individually owned Indian trust 22 or
restricted land23 represents one of the outstanding problems in Indian
15. In American law, escheat is a reversion of property to the state in the absence of any
individual competent to inherit. United States v. Board of Comm'r of Pub. Schools, 432 F.
Supp. 629, 630 (D. Md. 1977).
16. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, §§ 201-211, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986)).
17. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 709-10 (1987).
18. Id. at 717.
19. The nature of inheritance has been clarified in the following manner:
Inheritance arguably involves two related aspects of liberty and property. First,
there is the individual's interest in being able to transmit property at death either
by the law of intestacy or by designating what happens to his property after he
dies, the latter being known as 'freedom of testation.' The second and reciprocal
liberty/property aspect is the corresponding interest of potential heirs in
receiving property from the dead.
Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 749 (1984).
20. See supra note 15.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Many treaties which allotted land to Indian individuals or families provided that the
land be held in trust by the government.
23. In some cases Indians acquired title under a restriction against alienation without the
consent of the President. Treaty of October 23, 1826, United States-Miami Tribe of Indians, 7
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law.24 When the federal government originally negotiated treaties
with the Indians, it granted land to the tribe as a whole.2 5 Toward the
end of the nineteenth century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts
which divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into indi-
vidual allotments for Indians, with surplus land available for white
purchase.26 These Allotment Acts provided that the government
would hold title to the allotments in trust for twenty-five years.27 In
addition, under these Acts, certain Indians received allotments with a
restriction against alienation.28
Although the law has authorized Indians to devise their interests
in trust or restricted property from an early date,29 as a practical mat-
ter, a great deal of such land passed to Indian heirs through intestate
succession. 30 As a result, the heirs owned the allotment in undivided
interests-the heirs owned all of the tract together, rather than each
person owning a specific part.31 Because courts only allowed partition
of restricted Indian land if all the heirs agreed, Indian landowners
were unable to sell their land interests.3 2 Upon each landowner's
Stat. 300; Treaty of October 2, 1818, United States-Delaware nation of Indians, 7 Stat. 188;
Treaty of October 2, 1818, United States-Potawatamie nation of Indians, 7 Stat. 185.
24. See generally Langone, The Heirship Problem and Its Effect on the Indian, the Tribe,
and Effective Utilization, 2 TOWARD ECON. DEV. FOR NATIVE AM. COMMUNITIES 519, 541-
48 (1969) (a statistical account of the Indian heirship problem); Comment, Too Little Land,
Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REV. 709 (1971) (surveys
the Indian land problem and examines congressional intent in resolving the issue).
25. Comment, supra note 24, at 719.
26. General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-332 (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra
note 9, at 206-236 (1986).
27. General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-332.
28. The policy behind this restriction was to protect the Indian until he could assume the
role of a responsible landowner who knows how to till his own land and is aware of its value on
the market. Comment, supra note 24, at 720.
29. See Act of February 14, 1913, 37 Stat. 678, 25 U.S.C. § 373; Act of June 25, 1910, 36
Stat. 855, 856. As the former provision appears in the United States Code, anyone who is at
least twenty-one-years old and who has an interest in trust or restricted property may devise
his interest by a will, which is subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25
U.S.C. § 373. If the will is not approved, the allotment passes according to the law of the situs
state. F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 232.
30. Comment, supra note 24, at 721-24. Property passes through intestate succession
when the property owner dies without leaving a valid and operative will. Estate of Baird, 135
Cal. App. 2d 333, 287 P.2d 365 (1955); In re Cameron, 47 A.D. 120, 62 N.Y.S. 187 (1900),
aff'd, 166 N.Y. 1120 (1901). When an Indian owning an allotment dies without having made
a will, the Secretary of the Interior determines the heirs to the allotment in accordance with
state intestacy laws. F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 230. Before the General Allotment Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-332, however, heirs were determined in accordance with tribal custom. F.
COHEN, supra note 9, at 230. The result of this shift was further fractionation of the land
because state intestacy law split the allotments among more heirs. Id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4420.
32. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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death, his interest was often divided among his heirs according to
state intestacy laws, as most Indians failed to make wills. 33 Owner-
ship thus continued to fragment with each succeeding generation.
The federal government's allotment policies resulted in progres-
sive fractionation of ownership of the land, until most of the allot-
ments were held by so many owners that the property could not be
put to effective use.3 4 The Indians were forced into the role of absen-
tee landlords, leasing their allotted lands rather than farming it them-
selves and living upon the always diminishing rental income a.3  The
return to each heir was minimal,3 6 and as a result, all Indians who
owned these small land interests became disinterested in managing
the land.37 The resulting administrative headache was thrust upon
the government, forcing the Indian Service to act as an overworked
real-estate agent on behalf of the living allottees and the numerous
heirs of deceased allottees.3 s
In 1983, Congress attempted to ameliorate, over time, the prob-
lem of extreme fractionation of Indian lands by enacting the Indian
Land Consolidation Act.39 Congress passed this statute to facilitate
consolidation of tribal lands," to reduce the number of small frac-
33. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987).
36. Comment, supra note 24, at 711-13 ("For example, one young Sioux who received a
check for 7 cents as his share of a lease fee found that it would cost him 10 cents to cash the
check."). Id.; see Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1961).
37. Comment, supra note 24, at 712.
38. To illustrate the administrative disaster caused by the allotment of Indian lands, the
Supreme Court in Irving discussed Tract 1305 of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse
reservation, Irving, 481 U.S. at 713, dubbed "one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the
world." Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663
before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1984). The
Supreme Court in Irving stated:
Tract 1305 is forty acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. It is valued at
$8000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive less than $.05 in annual
rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than $1. The largest interest holder
receives $82.85 annually. The common denominator used to compute fractional
interests in the property is 3,394,923,849,000. The smallest heir receives $.01
every 177 years. If the tract were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for
its estimated $8000 value, he would be entitled to S.000418. The administrative
costs of handling this tract are estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at
$17,560 annually.
Irving, 481 U.S. at 713.
39. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983) (codifed as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986)).
40. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415-25.
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tional interests in individually allotted lands,4" and to keep trust or
restricted lands in Indian ownership by allowing tribes to adopt cer-
tain laws restricting inheritance of Indian lands to Indians.42 Section
207 of the Act provided that very small, individually owned land
interests shall escheat to the tribe upon the death of the owner, rather
than pass through intestacy or devise to the landowner's heirs:
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's
jurisdiction shall descedent [sic]43 by intestacy or devise but shall
escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less
of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less
than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat."
This provision became the most controversial of the Consolidation
Act.45 The conflict between individual Indian property rights and the
overall welfare of the tribe eventually led to the Supreme Court case
of Hodel v. Irving. 
46
B. Escheat as a Fifth Amendment Taking
In Hodel v. Irving,47 designated heirs and devisees of three
deceased members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe challenged the constitu-
tionality of Section 207, contending that the escheat provision
authorized a seizure of their property without providing just compen-
sation. The three appellees, Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed,
and Eileen Bissonette, represented four decedents who owned forty-
one fractional interests subject to Section 207 escheat.49 Although the
Irving estate lost two interests with a mere combined value of approx-
imately $100, Bissonette's decedent lost twenty-six escheatable inter-
ests with a total value of approximately $2,700, and the Pumpkin
Seed estate lost thirteen escheatable interests, valued at approximately
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The Senate Report accompanying the Act of October 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2519,
described how this obvious error made its way into the original text: "[Tihe bill actually voted
on by the House and Senate was garbled in the printing. It was this garbled version of Title II
that was signed by the President." S. REP. No. 632, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5470, 5471. The 1984 Act substituted the word
"descend" for "descendent."
44. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986)).
45. S. REP. No. 632, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5470, 5471.
46. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 709-10.
49. Id.
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$1,816.50 The United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota upheld the statute, reasoning that Congress had plenary
authority to abolish the power of testamentary disposition of Indian
property,51 and that the heirs and devisees had only an expectancy of
heirship and not a vested property right entitled to constitutional
protection.
52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the district court's latter reasoning; nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit determined that the heirs and devisees could assert the
third-party rights of their decedents. 3 The court held that Section
207 violated the fifth amendment because it did not provide for com-
pensation to the estates of the decedents for the land it declared to
escheat. 54
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the escheat provision
of the Consolidation Act, which provided for small undivided prop-
erty interests that were unproductive during the year preceding the
owner's death to escheat to the tribe, constituted a taking of the dece-
dents' property without just compensation.55 Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, agreed with the government that the
consolidation of Indian land is an important governmental purpose.
56
She nevertheless dismissed the government's arguments that the prop-
erty interests affected by Section 207 are negligible5 7 and that the
tribe, rather than the United States government, is the beneficiary of
the escheat.5 8 The Court noted that even though the income gener-
ated by the land in question is de minimus, the value of the land may
not be.59 The Court concluded that the economic impact of Section
207 upon the appellees could be considered substantial, as this prop-
erty' would have passed to them or to those they represent, but for
Section 207.61
Pursuant to the escheat provision at issue, small property inter-
50. Id. at 710.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
54. Id. at 1268-69.
55. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 at 709, 716-17.
56. Id. at 718.
57. Id. at 714-15.
58. Id. at 715-16.
59. Id. at 714.
60. Only the remainder interests are actually lost because appellees' decedents retained full
life estates and the power to convey their interests inter vivos. The value of these remainder
interests depends upon the age of the interest holder at death. Id. at 715.
61. Id. at 716-17 n.2.
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ests pass to the tribe rather than to the government,62 unlike tradi-
tional escheat in which the property escheats to the state upon the
failure of heirs to inherit a decedent's property. 63 The majority, how-
ever, did not give this distinction much weight.64 To the extent that
the owners of escheatable interests maintain a nexus with the tribe
and that the consolidation of tribal lands benefits the tribe members,
the majority admitted that there is an "average reciprocity of advan-
tage," 65 and that "the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum of
the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more productive
than fractionated lands."' 66 Therefore, the majority recognized the
legitimacy of the legislative goals.
Justice O'Connor, however, stressed the "extraordinary" 67 char-
acter of the escheat provision at issue, which completely abolishes
descent and devise, even when the governmental purpose sought to be
advanced, consolidation of Indian lands, would result from the fur-
ther descent of the property.68 The majority held this to be a fifth
amendment taking, determining that the escheat provision "goes too
far"69 because it is overinclusive.7 ° Before Congress amended Section
207,71 the statute did not contain any exceptions to prevent the
escheat of fractional interests when the passing of property to the
62. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986)).
63. See supra note 15.
64. Irving, 481 U.S. at 715.
65. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
66. Id. at 716.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 716-18. For example, if the heir already owned another undivided interest in the
property, his inheritance would result in consolidation of these interests.
69. Irving, 481 U.S. at 718 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
70. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,
responded to Justice O'Connor's reasoning by stating that the majority adopted "an
overbreadth analysis that has heretofore been restricted to the First Amendment area." Irving,
481 U.S. at 724. He argued that saying Section 207 "goes too far" may apply to some
decedents, but it does not apply to the appellees in this case because, if the appellees and other
potential heirs inherited the interests at issue, the fractionation of these interests would be
increased. Id. Stevens went on to cite United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1969), for the
proposition that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." Irving, 481
U.S at 725 (quoting Raines, 362 U.S. at 21).
71. The Eighth Circuit declared that both the original escheat provision of the
Consolidation Act and its amended version, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986),
unconstitutionally took property without just compensation. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260,
1261 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). The Supreme Court, however, stated that the
amended version was not at issue because none of the property that escheated in the case did so
pursuant to the amended version of the statute. Irving, 481 U.S. at 710 n. 1.
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heirs might result in consolidation of the property.72 The result, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded, is that "the regulation here amounts to vir-
tually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of
property-the small undivided interest-to one's heirs.""'
C. Escheat as a Due Process Violation
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the
escheat provision was unconstitutional, not because it resulted in a
taking of property without just compensation, but because it violated
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.74 Justice Stevens based
his opinion on the premise that Indians who owned fractional land
interests and were afforded ample notice of the escheat provision
could avoid escheat by voluntarily conveying their interests to a land-
owner who would have a large enough interest to avoid Section 207
entirely." Accordingly, he stated the issue as "whether Section 207
represents a lawful exercise of the sovereign's prerogative to condition
the retention of fee simple or other ownership interests upon the per-
formance of a modest statutory duty within a reasonable period of
time."
76
Justice Stevens then reviewed the legislative history behind Sec-
tion 207. In 1982, the Senate passed a bill that authorized the Devils
Lake Sioux Tribe of South Dakota to adopt a land consolidation pro-
gram, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.77 The
bill provided that the Tribe would compensate individual owners for
any fractional land interest it might acquire. 78 There was no escheat
provision.79 The House of Representatives added Section 207 to the
Senate bill upon the bill's consideration by the House Committee on
Indian Affairs. 80 The Senate accepted the House addition without
any hearings or discussion of the escheat provision.8 Interestingly,
the Consolidation Act specifically provided that fractional interests
acquired by a tribe pursuant to an approved program must be
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. Irving, 481 U.S. at 716.
74. Id. at 730-31 (Stevens, J., concurring); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75. Irving, 481 U.S. at 719 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. S. 503, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4419.
81. 128 CONG. REc. S15,568-70 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1982).
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purchased for a fair price; 2 however, Section 207 had no comparable
provision. Congress also omitted from the Consolidation Act a grace
period, which gave owners of fractional interests an opportunity to
avoid the impact of the statute by consolidating their interests with
those of other owners of similar interests.83
Departing from Justice O'Connor's takings analysis, Justice Ste-
vens determined that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
requires Congress to afford reasonable notice and opportunity for
compliance to Indians affected by Section 207.4 Justice Stevens
declared the majority's takings analysis to be inappropriate because
Section 207's escheat provision differs from conventional escheat in
two important ways.85  Escheat at common law provided for deter-
mining ownership of property if there were no heirs capable of inher-
iting. 6 Section 207, on the other hand, constitutes a forced escheat
provision, in which claimants who would otherwise inherit lose their
rights. There is yet another kind of escheat, which governs ownership
of abandoned property. Legislation authorizing the escheat of
unclaimed property typically provides, as a condition precedent to
escheat, an appropriate lapse of time and requires adequate notice to
ascertain that the property has indeed been abandoned. 7 Likewise,
legislation governing the escheat of property of decedents who die
intestate and without heirs also provides for notice and an opportu-
nity for interested parties to assert their claims.88 Justice Stevens
pointed out that a state may treat real property as having been aban-
doned if the owner fails to take certain affirmative steps to protect his
interest.8 9 These preconditions, however, are only reasonable if they
afford sufficient notice to the property owners and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to comply. 90 Section 207 did not provide for such a "grace
82. See Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, §§ 204-06, 96 Stat. 2517,
2519 (1983).
83. Id.
84. Irving, 481 U.S. at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 727 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. See generally Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1319 (1961) (an in-depth look at the history of escheat).
87. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 141, para. 102, 112 (1986) (property held by banking or
financial organizations); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW §§ 300-302 (McKinney 1944 and Supp.
1988) (property held by banking organizations).
88. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1420, 1423 (West 1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.101-.106 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1989).
89. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982) ("[A]s a result of the failure of the
property owner to perform the statutory condition, an interest in fee was deemed as a matter of
law to be abandoned and to lapse.").
90. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 n.15 (1985). The claimants' loss of their
mining rights was held not to be a fifth amendment taking because their failure to file a timely
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period;" therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress failed to
afford the Indians due process of law as required by the fifth
amendment. 9'
III. SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING FROM INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
Long before Congress enacted the Consolidation Act, there
seemed to exist a "curious psychological block in the minds of federal
officials" concerning the Indian heirship problem in general.92 The
"psychological block" consisted of "an over-compensative concern
with the property rights of individual Indians in heirship lands con-
joined with a complete aphasia concerning the practical effects on
Indian welfare of the existence of such lands." 93 Through the Consol-
idation Act, Congress attempted to resolve this conflict in favor of the
overall welfare of the tribe. The Supreme Court, on the other hand,
reacted to pressure by the claimants in Irving to protect the rights of
the individual Indian property owners. The psychological block thus
evolved into a standoff between the Legislature and the judiciary.
No matter how one analyzes Hodel v. Irving, the unique constitu-
tional nature of Indian property and property rights must be kept in
the forefront. From the early nineteenth century, there have been two
lines of eminent domain cases concerning Indian property interests
decided by the Supreme Court, which seem to be in historical con-
flict.94 The first line, exemplified by Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,9" recog-
claim under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act caused their property rights to be
extinguished. Id. The Supreme Court stated:
Common-law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to retain his
property until the common law would recognize it as abandoned. Legislatures
can enact substantive rules of law that treat property as forfeited under
conditions that the common law would not consider sufficient to indicate
abandonment. As long as proper notice of these rules exist, and the burdens they
impose are not wholly disproportionate to the burdens other individuals face in a
highly regulated society that some people are being forced "alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, must be borne by the public as a
whole," the burden imposed is a reasonable restriction on the property right.
Locke, 471 U.S. at 106 n.15 (1984) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then determined that the filing requirement
was a reasonable restriction on the continued retention of mining claims. Id.
91. Irving, 481 U.S. at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Gilbert & Taylor, Indian Land Questions, 8 ARIz. L. REV. 102, 116 (1967).
93. Id. Although the "over-compensative concern" probably stems from the fact that
many of these Indian tribes originally occupied and roamed over territory now embraced
within the United States, the Indians do not have a greater property interest in their lands as a
result. After the discovery of North America, England claimed sovereignty over the lands, but
recognized the possessory right of the Indians over the lands that they occupied. United States
v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 302 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 539 (1932). The Indians'
aboriginal claim to lands thus was not fee simple.
94. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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nizes "that Congress possesse[s] a paramount power over the property
of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their
interests, and that such authority might be implied, even though
opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians. ' 96 The second
line, exemplified by Shoshone Tribe v. United States,9 7 concedes Con-
gress' paramount power over Indian property, but nonetheless holds
that "[tihe power does not extend so far as to enable the Government
'to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own
purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just
compensation.' ,98
In 1968, in Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States,99 the
United States Court of Claims distinguished between cases in which
one or the other principle is applicable:
It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as trustee
for the benefit of the Indians, exercising its plenary powers over the
Indians and their property, as it thinks is in their best interests, and
(2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, taking the
Indians' property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. In any given situation in which Congress has
acted with regard to the Indian people, it must have acted either in
one capacity or the other. Congress can own two hats, but it can-
not wear them both at the same time.'°°
The court articulated a test to reconcile these two lines of decisions,
holding that when "Congress makes a good faith effort to give the
Indians the full value of the land and thus merely transmutes the
property from land to money, there is no taking."' 0 '
In enacting the escheat provision at issue in Irving, Congress,
95. 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 301
U.S. 358 (1937); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310 (1911); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306 (1902); Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 88 Ct.
Cl. 1 (1938), supplemental opinion, 88 Ct. Cl. 43, 47, aff'd, 307 U.S. 1 (1939).
96. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). If a taking of treaty-protected
property is alleged, it must be recognized that "tribal lands are subject to Congress' power to
control and manage the tribe's affairs. But this power to control and manage [is] not absolute.
While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is]
subject to limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional
restrictions." United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)).
97. 299 U.S. 476 (1937); see also United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S.
119 (1938); Uintah & White River Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 953
(1957).
98. Shoshone Tribe, 299 U.S. at 497 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,
110 (1935)).
99. 390 F.2d 686 (1968).
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id.
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instead of exercising its power of eminent domain, acted under its
plenary powers over the Indians and their property. Section 207 does
not provide for eminent domain; rather, it provides for escheat. The
difference is that the United States did not take the property for a
public purpose or provide just compensation to the decedents' estates.
Instead, the property reverted to the tribe as a result of a legislative
determination that there were no heirs competent to inherit these
small interests.
10 2
To the extent that property rights already vested in individual
Indians, however, the property in question in Irving can no longer be
regarded as part of tribal lands. In Choate v. Trapp, the Supreme
Court recognized this difference, stating that "there is a broad distinc-
tion between tribal property and private property, and between the
power to abrogate a statute and the authority to destroy rights
acquired under such law."' °3 In Choate, the issue was whether a tax
exemption provided for in the Act of June 28, 1898 (the Atoka Agree-
ment)"°4 constituted a right that could be abrogated by congressional
legislation passed after the land had been allotted.10° The Atoka
Agreement also contained a temporal restriction on each Indian's
right to alienate the land allotted to him. 106 Subsequent to the closing
of tribal citizenship rolls, Congress passed the Act of May 27, 1908,07
which removed the restriction on alienation and provided that, from
that time on, the land should be subject to taxation.108
The Supreme Court held that, upon the allotment of land to the
plaintiff Indian, the Atoka Agreement vested certain enforceable
rights in the Indians who were on the citizenship rolls, including the
right to have their land exempt from taxation."° In discussing Con-
gress' right to remove the restriction on alienation, but its lack of
power to deprive the Indians of the tax exemption on the same land,
the Court stated:
The right to remove the restriction [on alienation] was in pursu-
ance of the power under which Congress could legislate as to the
status of the ward and lengthen or shorten the period of disability.
But the provision that the land should be non-taxable was a prop-
erty right, which Congress undoubtedly had the power to grant.
That right fully vested in the Indians and was binding upon
102. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1264 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
103. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 671 (1912).
104. Ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
105. Choate, 224 U.S. at 671.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312 (1908).
108. Id.
109. Choate, 224 U.S. 665.
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Oklahoma. There have been comparatively few cases which dis-
cuss the legislative power over private property held by the Indi-
ans. But those few all recognize that he is not excepted from the
protection guaranteed by the Constitution. His private rights are
secured and enforced to the same extent and in the same way as
other residents or citizens of the United States .... His right ofprivate property is not subject to impairment by legislative action,
even while he is, as a member of a tribe, subject to the guardianship
of the United States as to his political and personal status.1"0
Under this analysis, the private property rights of Indians should not
be given more or less constitutional protection than the property
rights of any United States citizen.
Applying the reasoning of Choate to Irving, it is unlikely that the
latter case turned upon the particular facts that the property interests
in question were owned by individual Indians. Although policymak-
ers have recently had an overcompensatory concern with regard to
the protection of Indians' rights,"II an individual Indian's property
interests are protected by the same provisions of the Constitution as
are the property interests of any other property owner. The extremely
serious problem of fractionation of Indian landsII2 apparently did not
sway the Court from giving constitutional protection to the ability to
transmit and receive property at death. Thus it appears that the
Irving decision could be extended beyond the case's particular facts to
other situations in which both descent and devise of a particular class
of property are completely abolished, even if policy reasons in favor of
such a taking are not present. Furthermore, by giving small fraction-
ated property interests fifth amendment protection despite the govern-
ment's argument that such interests are merely de minimus, 113 the
Court appears to have emphasized the importance of private property
rights, no matter how small. Seemingly negligible property interests
are sufficient for purposes of the Constitution.
The Irving opinion, however, does not indicate clearly whether
the majority's analysis would have been the same if the Indians' inter-
ests had been limited in the first instance. When the individual Indi-
ans received their allotments, no restrictions were placed upon the
property's inheritability.114 As time passed and the ownership inter-
ests became so fractionalized that tracts of land had too many owners
110. Id. at 673, 677.
I 11. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 5-12 & 22-35 and accompanying text.
113. Irving, 481 U.S. at 714.
114. H.R. REP. No. 908, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4415, 4420.
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to be used effectively, Congress took action and limited the right to
inheritance for minor property interests."1 ' Under the Irving Court's
analysis, depriving the Indian landowners of the right to inheritance
of these very small interests still constituted a taking of a valuable
property right. It is not clear, however, whether Justice O'Connor
premised her opinion on the theory that, since the Indians had origi-
nally received the land without any restrictions, their property inter-
ests had vested, and thus the subsequent limitation on their "bundle
of rights"'116 constituted a taking.
IV. TRADITIONAL ESCHEAT AFTER IRVING
A. Escheat Under the Uniform Probate Code
An analogy can be drawn between Congress' implementation of
the escheat provision at issue in Irving and a state legislature's adop-
tion of the Uniform Probate Code." 7  Fundamental differences
between the two escheat doctrines, however, prevent the Court's hold-
ing in Irving from applying to intestate escheat. At common law,
property would escheat to the lord in the absence of any heir capable
of claiming the lands of a decedent under a will. " 8 Historically in the
United States, an intestate's property would escheat to the state only
in the absence of all blood relatives. ' Every jurisdiction historically
forbade escheat if there were legitimate nonalien blood relatives,
regardless of how remote they were.120
Under the Uniform Probate Code, on the other hand, inheritance
by collateral relatives is limited to grandparents and those descended
115. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986).
116. Irving, 481 U.S. at 716 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S 164, 176
(1979)).
117. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Bar Association approved the Uniform Probate Code in August of 1969. It has been adopted
by sixteen states. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005-.36.100 (1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
1101 to -7307 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1987); FLA. STAT.
§§ 731.005-735.302, 737.101-.512 (1987); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-101 to :8-102 (1985);
IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -7-307 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.650-.670 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (adopted only Article VII, Part I); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-
101 to 8-401 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.5001 to .5993 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (West 1975); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to -5-502 (1988);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to -7-401 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100 to -7-602
(Law. Co-op. 1987); and UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -8-101 (1978).
118. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 42 (1937). See generally Note,
supra note 86.
119. T. ATKINSON, supra note 118, at 74-76. In the United States, personal as well as real
property may escheat. Id.
120. Id.
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from grandparents.1 21 When a state adopts the Uniform Probate
Code, the effect is similar to the promulgation of Section 207 of the
Indian Land Consolidation Act because remote heirs lose their right
to inherit the decedent's property, a right which they would have
retained if the jurisdiction followed the tradition of common law
escheat.1 22 Adopting the Uniform Probate Code, however, would not
rise to the level of a fifth amendment taking because of the fundamen-
tal difference between the escheat provided for in the Uniform Pro-
bate Code and the escheat at issue in Irving. The Uniform Probate
Code provides that, in the course of intestate succession, a decedent's
property will descend to his heirs, but if the decedent has no grand-
parents or relatives who have descended from his grandparents, the
decedent's estate escheats to the state.1 23 Of course, this provision
does not nullify the decedent's freedom of testation because he could
avoid escheat by leaving a will.
In contrast, Section 207124 is a forced escheat provision because it
cannot be avoided by will. It effectively provides that no heirs are
competent to inherit minor property interests, and that the property
must, if overly fractionated, revert to the tribe. There are three ways
in which an owner of escheatable property may avoid the effect of
Section 207. First, the owner may purchase additional interests from
co-owners and thereby increase his ownership interest to more than
two percent of the tract. 25 Second, the owner may convey his owner-
ship interest to relatives or co-owners and reserve a life estate.'
26
Third, if feasible, the tract may be partitioned in such a way as to
enlarge the owner's interest in a portion of the tract.1 27 None of these
avoidance techniques, however, involve the descent or devise of the
property interest. Thus, although both types of escheat could be
avoided by an affirmative action of the property owner, the Court's
holding that "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a
121. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (1982).
122. See United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, More or Less, In Loudoun County,
Virginia, 800 F.2d 434 (1986) (In Virginia, land escheats to the state only as a last resort.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1987) (providing for intestate inheritance by even the most remote
descendants).
123. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-103, 2-105 (1982).
124. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
125. Irving, 481 U.S. at 723 n.6 (1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. Shortly after the Consolidation Act went into effect, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
of the Department of the Interior issued a memorandum to all area directors, instructing them
that the statute had been enacted. Id. at 722. This memorandum then explained these three
methods by which an owner of a fractionated interest could enlarge his interest to more than
two percent, thereby avoiding the impact of Section 207. Id. at 723.
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particular class of property may be a taking"'1 2s does not apply to
intestate escheat.
In the final analysis, the analogy between the adoption of the
Uniform Probate Code and the promulgation of Section 207 works in
terms of the impact these provisions have on property owners who fail
to take any steps to avoid escheat. The analogy, however, does not
work in terms of determining whether there has been a taking because
of the Court's emphasis on inheritance. The escheat provision in the
Uniform Probate Code does not totally abrogate the descent and
devise of a decedent's property, while Section 207 does. Therefore, the
former does not result in a fifth amendment taking. This analysis rein-
forces the emphasis that the Irving Court placed on one's ability to
transmit and receive property at death. Justice O'Connor conceded
that the escheat provision could be avoided through inter vivos trans-
actions, but dismissed these avoidance techniques as "not an adequate
substitute for the rights taken."1 29
B. Escheat of Abandoned Property
The escheat provision at issue in Irving may also be analogized to
the escheat of abandoned property. 130  Generally, abandonment is
presumed when the person in custody of the property cannot locate
the property owner.' 3  The policy behind most abandoned property
statutes is to prevent the deterioration of unused property through
abandonment. 32 In this respect, the escheat of abandoned property
serves a similar purpose to Section 207, which Congress enacted to
consolidate fractionated Indian lands and thereby put the property to
more efficient use.
Nonetheless, in Texaco v. Short,'33 the Supreme Court held that
the escheat of abandoned property was not a fifth amendment tak-
ing.134 In Texaco, the owners of lapsed mineral interests challenged
128. Id. at 717.
129. Id. at 716.
130. See, e.g., In re Estate of Russell, 387 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (taker under
will could not be located). See generally Overton, A Study of Constitutional Problems and
Policy Decisions in Drafting an Escheat Statute for Tennessee, 34 TENN. L. REV. 173 (1967).
131. Note, supra note 86, at 1330.
132. For example, the New York Abandoned Property Law declares that it is the policy of
the state "while protecting the interest of the owners thereof, to utilize escheated lands and
unclaimed property for the benefit of all the people of the state." N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW
§ 102 (McKinney Supp. 1988); see also Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
The right of the state to abandoned property has been compared to a right of succession, under
which the state takes when other rightful claimants cannot be found. Barker v. Leggett, 102 F.
Supp. 642 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
133. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
134. Id.
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the constitutionality of an Indiana statute,1 35 under which a mineral
lease that was not used for twenty years automatically lapsed and
reverted to the current surface owner, unless the mineral owner filed a
statement of claim in the local county recorder's office.136 The
Supreme Court held that the mineral owner's failure to make any use
of the property, rather than any state action, caused the lapse of his
property right under the Mineral Lapse Act, and therefore there was
no taking. 137
The difference in result between Texaco and Irving strengthens
the due process argument made by Justice Stevens in his concurrence
in Irving. 38 Justice Stevens would most likely argue that the major
difference between the statutes in question in Irving and Texaco is that
the Indiana statute provided a two-year grace period to afford prop-
erty owners adequate time to familiarize themselves with the terms of
the statute and to take any action deemed appropriate to protect their
property interests. 139 Section 207 provided no such luxury, and that
failure sparked Stevens' concurrence, which argued that the escheat
provision was unconstitutional because it deprived the decedents due
process of law. I4I Even though both statutes provided for the lapse or
escheat of private property upon failure of some affirmative action by
the interest owner to avoid the impact of the statute, whether the pro-
vision affords the property owner sufficient notice and a reasonable
opportunity to comply will determine whether or not the statute
results in a taking.
41
V. IRVING'S EFFECT ON INHERITANCE
A. Inheritance Before Irving
At first blush, the Supreme Court's holding in Irving seems to be
the logical application of constitutional analysis to a provision which
does indeed deprive one of the power to alienate his property at death.
The historical treatment of inheritance by courts and commentators,
however, renders the majority's takings analysis more attenuated.
42
Traditionally, inheritance has been viewed as a privilege rather than
135. Dormant Mineral Interests Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (Bums 1980 &
Supp. 1988) (commonly known as the Mineral Lapse Act).
136. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518-19.
137. Id. at 530.
138. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518-19.
140. Irving, 481 U.S. at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 n.15 (1985); see supra note 90.
142. See supra note 19.
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as a constitutional right. 14 3 More recently, however, the characteriza-
tion of inheritance as a "right" or a "privilege" has lost its signifi-
cance, in accordance with the general decline of the right-privilege
distinction in modem constitutional law.'" The source of the ability
to transmit and receive property at death, whether constitutional or
statutory in nature, is much more important than the characterization
of the power. 45 It is commonly accepted that the right of inheritance
is purely a creature of statute. 146 Rules of inheritance, except as to
rights already vested, may be freely changed and modified by the leg-
islature. Once the property has passed into the hands of the heir after
the ancestor's death, the heir's property interest becomes vested and
cannot be taken away without due process of law. 147  Wisconsin
enjoys the distinction of being the only state to have recognized any-
thing approaching a legal right of inheritance.
148
143. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898); Mager v. Grima, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850). See generally Kornstein, supra note 19 (argument that
inheritance could constitutionally be abolished).
144. Kornstein, supra note 19, at 749 n.46; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972) ("[T]be Court has fully and finally rejected thee wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.");
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (Whether any procedural protections are due to
a citizen following revocation of a governmental benefit does not depend on whether the
governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or a "privilege."); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ("[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights
turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'). See
generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
145. Kornstein, supra note 19, at 750 n.46.
146. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898); Wallace v. Meyers, 38 F.
184 (1889); Wilson v. Storthz, 117 Ark. 418, 175 S.W. 45 (1915); In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal.
91, 121 P. 370 (1912); Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 155 Fla. 482, 20 So. 2d 647
(1945); Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 141 S.E. 42 (1927); National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N.E. 973 (1911); Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N.E. 1047
(1892); State v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11, 106 N.W. 93 (1905); In re Luckey's Estate, 206 Neb. 53,
291 N.W.2d 235 (1980); In re White's Estate, 208 N.Y. 64, 101 N.E. 793 (1913); In re Inman,
101 Or. 182, 199 P. 615 (1921); In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929); Gibson
v. Rikard, 143 S.C. 402, 141 S.E. 726 (1928); Powers v. Morrison, 88 Tex. 133, 30 S.W. 851
(1895); Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943).
147. Miami County Nat'l Bank v. Bancroft, 121 F.2d 921, 925 (10th Cir. 1941).
148. See Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 197-98, 108 N.W. 627, 628 (1906) ("The
right to take property by inheritance or by will is a natural right protected by the [Wisconsin]
Constitution, which cannot be wholly taken away or substantially impaired by the
Legislature."); accord In re Estate of Eisenberg, 90 Wis. 2d 620, 280 N.W.2d 359, appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 976 (1979); In re Estate of Uihlein, 269 Wis. 170, 68 N.W. 2d 816 (1955);
In re Ogg's Estate, 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952); In re Szperka's Will, 254 Wis. 153, 35
N.W. 2d 209 (1948). Contra In re Estate of Blumreich, 84 Wis. 2d 545, 267 N.W.2d 870, 874
(1978) ("[T]he law of descent and distribution is of legislative origin and subject to the control
of the legislature."); see Kornstein, supra note 19, at 787 (survey of representative state law
holding inheritance not to be a natural or inherent right).
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B. Inheritance After Irving: Has It Changed?
Given this backdrop, the Supreme Court's decision in Irving
breathes new life into the theory of inheritance as a constitutional
right. Justice O'Connor phrased the Court's holding rather tenta-
tively: "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a partic-
ular class of property may be a taking." 14 9 The Court concluded that
Section 207, which provides for small, undivided fractionated land
interests to escheat to the tribe, "goes too far"' 5 ° because there was no
exception for circumstances in which inheritance of these small inter-
ests would result in consolidation of the land.15
Justice O'Connor's reasoning adds a new dimension to fifth
amendment takings analysis, The Court applied an implicit over-
breadth analysis to the escheat provision and held that there was a
fifth amendment taking because the provision was overinclusive-that
is, descent and devise of minor fractionated interests were abolished in
all cases, even when inheritance would have resulted in consolidation
of the property. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that over-
breadth analysis had previously been restricted to issues concerning
first amendment freedom of expression. 1 2  In Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 1 3 the Supreme Court defined a statute as overbroad if, in addi-
tion to proscribing activities that may constitutionally be forbidden, it
also sweeps within its coverage speech or conduct that is protected by
first amendment freedom of speech or freedom of association guaran-
tees. 5 4 The Court in Irving applied the same reasoning when it said
that Section 207 "goes too far" by taking "the extraordinary step of
abolishing both descent and devise of these property interests even
when the passing of the property to the heir might result in consolida-
tion of the property."' 55 In stark contrast to the Court's treatment of
inheritability in Irving, the Court had stated forty-five years earlier in
Irving Trust v. Day:156 "Rights of succession to the property of a
deceased.., are of statutory creation .... Nothing in the Federal
Constitution forbids... limit[ing], condition[ing], or even abolish[ing]
149. Irving, 481 U.S. at 717.
150. Id. at 718 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 724 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
154. Id. In later cases, the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the use of overbreadth
analysis in first amendment cases. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)
(requiring that the overbreadth be "substantial," compared with the legitimate applications of
the statute).
155. Irving, 481 U.S. at 718.
156. 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
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the power of testamentary disposition over property""' 7
Thus, the holding of Irving puts teeth into the argument that the
right of inheritance has a constitutional rather than a purely statutory
basis because the Court implicitly reasoned that the escheat provision
swept too broadly into an area protected by the fifth amendment tak-
ings clause.15 This holding departs from the judiciary's previous
notion of inheritance as a privilege that could be constitutionally abol-
ished by statute. 59
The 1984 amendment' 6° to the Consolidation Act represented a
valiant effort by Congress to reconcile the opposing concerns of prac-
ticality and efficiency with individual property rights. Section 207,
the escheat provision, was amended to (1) permit a devise of such
interests to other owners of a fractionated interest in such land;1 6' (2)
to allow for a five-year "lookback" to determine whether the land has
earned its owner less than $100 in any one of the five years before the
decedent's death, in order to more fairly evaluate the land interest's
true economic value;162 (3) to allow for rebuttal of the statutory pre-
sumption that the land is without significant economic value; 63 and
(4) to allow tribes to adopt a code of their own to provide for a dispo-
sition of such minor fractionated interests, provided such codes
accomplish the purpose of this section-to prevent the further descent
or fractionation of such interests.' 64
It is interesting to question whether the Supreme Court would
have determined that there was a taking in Irving had the plaintiffs
contested the constitutionality of the amended escheat provision.
Conveniently, none of the property in question escheated under the
amended version of the statute; therefore, the Court expressed no
opinion on the constitutionality of Section 207 as amended. Further-
more, the Eighth Circuit held that both the original version of the
escheat provision and the amended version were unconstitutional, but
the Supreme Court deemed this finding to be dicta.
65
Applying Justice O'Connor's reasoning to the amended version
of Section 207 does not work because the amendment, among other
changes, loosens the restrictive language of the provision to permit a
157. Id. at 562.
158. Irving, 481 U.S. at 716-18.
159. Federal courts and all state courts except Wisconsin's regarded inheritance as a
statutory creation. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
160. Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986).
161. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b).
162. Id. § 2206(a).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 2206(c).
165. Irving, 481 U.S. at 710 n.1.
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devise of these minor fractionated interests to other owners of frac-
tionated interests.166 The argument that the provision extended to sit-
uations in which permitting the devise would result in the sought after
result--consolidation of minor fractionated land interests-now fails.
With its amendment, Section 207 is no longer overbroad. If the Court
had held that there was a taking under the amended escheat provi-
sion, then it would be anomolous to retain the currently favored
notion of inheritance as a statutory creation.
167
C. Limitations on Freedom of Testation Not a
Fifth Amendment Taking
There may be many conditions placed upon the ability to transfer
property at death, in which to avoid the effect of a certain statute, a
decedent must have acted. For example, omitted spouse rules 168 and
pretermitted heir statutes 169 protect the families of decedents who
failed to provide for them in their wills. Uniform Probate Code Sec-
tion 2-301 provides:
If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who
married the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted
spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he would have
received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from the will
that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for the
spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the
testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
170
Likewise, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-302"" provides for chil-
dren born or adopted after the execution of the will who were not
166. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
167. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
168. At common law, a man's preexisting will was deemed revoked after marriage and the
birth of a child. J. GAUBATZ & I. BLOOM, ESTATES, TRUSTS AND TAXES: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE WEALTH TRANSMISSION PROCESS 6-30 (1983). A woman's will, in
contrast, was deemed revoked after marriage alone. Id. Subsequent will acts neglected to
distinguish between the conditions for implied revocation of a married man's or woman's will,
lumping both into the phrase "revocations by operation of law." Id. Courts soon began to
imply the revocation of a man's preexisting will after marriage alone. Id.
169. The purpose of pretermitted heir statutes is to protect a child's right to take, unless the
will clearly expresses an intentional omission. Crump's Estate v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096
(Okla. 1980). Every state except Lousiana allows a testator to disinherit his children as long as
his will unambiguously demonstrates his intent. J. GAUBATZ & I. BLOOM, supra note 165, at
6-35; see infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. See generally Laube, The Right of a
Testator to Pauperize his Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559 (1928).
170. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a) (1982).
171. Sections 203(a) and (b) of the Uniform Probate Code provide:
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or adopted
after the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share in the estate
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provided for in the testator's will. These provisions whittle away
some of the testator's freedom of testation, but like the abandoned
property statute and the escheat provision of the Indian Land Consol-
idation Act, the effect of these statutes may be avoided upon the per-
formance of a statutory duty.172 In order to avoid the effect of the
Indiana statute at issue in Texaco v. Short, the mineral owner had to
take one of three steps to establish his continuing interest in the prop-
erty. 173 In order to prevent escheat of minor Indian land interests, an
owner needed to consolidate his interests with those of other owners
of similar interests.' 74 The escheat provision, however, was held to
constitute a taking, unlike the other statutory provisions addressed
above. The Supreme Court in Irving stressed that the "complete abo-
lition of both the descent and devise of a particular class of property"
was unacceptable under the Constitution. 75 If Justice O'Connor did
not premise her opinion on the notion of a constitutional basis for
inheritance, then using Justice O'Connor's takings analysis to distin-
guish Section 207 from the statute in Texaco and from rules limiting
the right of inheritance, such as the omitted spouse rules or pretermit-
ted heir rules, is very difficult. One probably must resort to Justice
equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more children and
devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the
intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by
statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence.
(b) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in his will for
a living child solely because he believes the child to be dead, the child receives a
share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the
testator had died intestate.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a)-(b) (1982).
172. To avoid the impact of the omitted spouse or the pretermitted heir statutes, a testator
must provide for his spouse and children in his will, and if he desires to disinherit a child, he
must make his intention to do so unambiguous. Crump's Estate v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096,
1097 (Okla. 1980) (Intent to disinherit must be apparent from the four comers of the will in
clear and convincing language.). The Uniform Probate Code makes it very difficult to
disinherit a spouse because a spouse is provided with an elective share under Section 2-201.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201 (1982).
173. A severed mineral interest would not terminate under the Mineral Lapse Act, supra
note 135, if during a period of twenty years the owner engages in actual production or collects
rents or royalties from another who does so, if he pays any taxes on the interest, or if he files a
written statement of claim in the county recorder's office. Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530
(1982).
174. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
175. Irving, 481 U.S. at 717.
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Stevens' due process analysis 176 to make sensible distinctions.
There are, however, statutes that limit inheritance and may not
be avoided upon the performance of a statutory duty. In Louisiana, a
parent may not disinherit a child except for causes of disinheritance
enumerated in the Louisiana Civil Code, and then only expressly and
by name. 177 Under the Louisiana Constitution, the child's right to
inherit a fixed portion of his parent's estate is vested.1 78 Although a
child has no vested right in his parent's property prior to the parent's
death, he has both a constitutional right as well as a statutory right to
the forced portion. 179 Louisiana courts have even stated that "[tihere
is no right more sacred than that of a forced heir to inherit his
legitime.'1 0
Apparently, Lousiana places a greater importance on a descen-
dant's right to receive property from the dead than an individual's
freedom of testation. 8 ' The effect of forced heir rules is to eliminate a
portion of the property a decedent is free to bequeath to whomever he
pleases, if he leaves descendants. This result can be distinguished
from the effect of the escheat provision at issue in Irving because
escheat is a reversion of property in the absence of an individual com-
petent to inherit."8 2 The Court in Irving concluded that Congress
completely abolished descent and devise in the Consolidation Act.
183
Forced heir statutes, on the other hand, allow for property to pass by
descent; only the testator's freedom of testation is affected. This dis-
tinction makes it more likely that the Irving Court granted constitu-
176. Id. at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
177. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1619-22, 1624 (West 1987). The causes that would be
sufficient for a parent to disinherit a child are as follows: if the child has raised his or her hand
to strike the parent; if the child has been guilty towards a parent of cruelty, a crime, or a
grievous injury; if the child has attempted to kill the parent; if the child has accused the parent
of any capital crime (except for high treason); if the child has refused sustenance to a parent
when the child had the means to afford it; if the child has neglected to take care of an insane
parent; if the child refused to pay ransom for a captive parent; if the child has coerced the
parent to prevent the parent from making a will; if the child has refused to order release from
prison of a parent when the child had the means to do so; and if the child has committed a
felony for which the punishment provided by law could be life imprisonment or death. Id. at
art. 1621-22.
178. The Lousiana Constitution provides, "No law shall abolish forced heirship. The
determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for
disinherison shall be provided by law." LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5.
179. Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982).
180. Succession of Landry, 463 So. 2d 681, 684 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Succession of Guerre,
197 So. 2d 738, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1967), writs denied, 250 La. 928, 929, 933, 199 So. 2d 925,
926 (1967).
181. See supra note 19.
182. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 1264 (8th' Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 704 (1987);
United States v. Board of Comm'r of Pub. Schools, 432 F. Supp. 629, 630 (D. Md. 1977).
183. Irving, 481 U.S. at 716-18.
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tional protection to the individual's right to have his property pass to
his heirs at death and the corresponding interest in the heirs to receive
property from the dead, and not to the individual's freedom to desig-
nate who these heirs will be. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor's takings
analysis does not extend to statutes limiting freedom of testation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that the Supreme Court held that there was a fifth
amendment taking in Hodel v. Irving 184 does not mean that there is a
taking whenever one's ability to transmit and receive property is lim-
ited, preconditioned, or abrogated. The opinion, however, strength-
ens the historically weak argument that inheritance does have a
constitutional basis.' 85 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's overbreadth
analysis adds an additional step to traditional takings analysis. Bor-
rowing a page from the first amendment free speech context, the
majority emphasized the overinclusiveness of Section 207, in that the
statute provided for escheat of all interests that were small enough to
meet the statutory description, even if the descent of some of those
interests might have resulted in property consolidation."8 6
The major question that remains unanswered is whether the
Court would have found a taking under the amended version of Sec-
tion 207.187 The 1984 version of the escheat provision carves out
exceptions to prevent escheat if the statute's policies would be fur-
thered by descent.1 8   The overbreadth analysis would no longer
apply, and the Court would be forced to face the more difficult issue
of whether to give fifth amendment protection to the right of
inheritance.
SUZANNE S. SCHMID
184. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
185. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
186. The Court stated:
[B]efore § 207 was enacted appellee's decedents had the power to pass on their
property at death to those who already owned an interest in the subject property.
This right too was abrogated by § 207; each of the appellees' decedents lost this
stick in their bundles of property rights upon the enactment of § 207.
Irving, 481 U.S. at 716-17 n.2.
187. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
188. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(b)-(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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